Tag
general_equilibrium
15 findings
Methods & evidenceCaste-Stratified Market Penetration RandomizationGenerated exogenous cross-village coverage variation ranging from 0% to 53% for cultivators and 0% to 100% for landless laborers, with zero statistically significant correlation to village size, caste concentration, or number of castes after conditioning on eligibility shares.RCTDevelopmentCaste-Stratified Village Identification StrategyConditioning on eligibility population shares eliminates endogeneity bias, reducing correlations between insurance marketing proportions and village characteristics (such as caste concentration and total households) to statistically insignificant levels (p-values > 0.33).RCTEconomics (general)Cultivator Risk-Taking and Labor Demand VolatilityA 1 standard deviation increase in rainfall increases harvest labor demand by 3.3 days more for insured cultivators than uninsured cultivators (a 22% relative increase). A 10% increase in insured cultivators lowers drought wages by 33% at the 20th percentile of rainfall, but raises wages by 29% at the 80th percentile of rainfall.RCTEconomics (general)Dual-Market Side Insurance NeutralityJoint coverage eliminates net market wage volatility relative to a no-insurance baseline, while increasing median rainfall wages by 11.7% and 80th percentile rainfall wages by 19%.RCTDevelopmentDual-Sided Balanced Insurance Market StabilizationSimultaneously marketing rainfall insurance to both cultivators and laborers eliminates excess wage volatility relative to a no-insurance baseline, while increasing average daily wages by 11.7% at median rainfall and by 19.0% at the 80th percentile of rainfall.RCTLabour & employmentDuration Dependence Bias in Treatment Intensity CalibrationAccounting for negative duration dependence reduces estimated baseline treatment intensity from 30% to 26% (and down to 21% when adjusting for reduced benefit inflow). Lower assumed baseline treatment intensity ($\tau^e = 0.20$) implies stronger displacement externalities on nonparticipants, causing social welfare to decline faster as program scale increases.Observational StudyLabour & employmentEquilibrium Displacement ExternalitiesAt baseline French market tightness ($\theta = 0.42$), displacement externalities reduce net aggregate job creation to 68%–73% of the measured firm-level treatment impact ($ED(\sigma)/\sigma AB \approx 0.68\text{--}0.73$), demonstrating that equilibrium spillover losses offset roughly 27%–32% of firm-level hiring gains.Expert TheoryLabour & employmentEquilibrium Search Modeling via Indirect InferenceA full rollout ($\tau = 1.0$) decreases overall social welfare by 0.13% and increases aggregate government spending due to high program costs (2,122 DKK per worker) and market congestion. While microeconometric methods wrongly estimate a 4,094 DKK net gain per participant, structural modeling proves welfare is maximized at 20% participation and government expenditure is minimized at 30% participation.Expert TheoryEconomics (general)General Equilibrium Program Evaluation Gap in Scaled InterventionsMarketing insurance exclusively to cultivators reduces drought wages for landless laborers by 0.63 log points at the 30th percentile of rainfall, demonstrating that partial-equilibrium evaluations miss severe welfare losses among non-treated groups.RCTLabour & employmentGeneral Equilibrium Wage SpilloversIn India's NREGA, 80 percent of the total earnings increase for participants resulted from higher private sector wages rather than direct program transfers. In Ethiopia, public works rollouts increased private sector wages by 9 to 18 percent by reducing private sector labor supply.RCTEconomics (general)Insurable Interest Exclusion and GE Welfare SpilloverMarketing insurance solely to cultivators (25.6% coverage) reduces drought wages by 0.63 log points at the 30th percentile of rainfall and 0.23 log points at median rainfall. Jointly offering insurance to both cultivators (25.6%) and laborers (31.8%) eliminates wage volatility, raising median rainfall wages by 11.7% and 80th percentile wages by 19%.RCTEducationLinear-in-Means Peer Externalities ModelThe theoretical framework demonstrates that under linear-in-means peer assumptions, student re-sorting does not alter aggregate population test scores ($\bar{Y} = \beta_0 \bar{X} + \beta_1 \bar{X}$); individual gains are strictly offset by losses to non-participants unless $\beta_2 > 0$.Expert TheoryDevelopmentPersuasive Marketing Business-Stealing vs Product Quality EquilibriumIn competitive market equilibrium with fixed aggregate consumer demand, persuasive marketing instruction primarily reallocates revenue across rival microenterprises (generating negative externalities for non-treated firms), whereas true industry-wide productivity growth requires cost reductions, product quality enhancements, or product differentiation.Expert TheoryEconomics (general)Policy-Relevant Treatment Effect vs. Microeconometric BiasAt experimental intensity ($\tau = 0.3$), participants enjoyed a 5.4 percentage point higher monthly matching rate than nonparticipants (0.245 vs 0.191). However, the policy-relevant treatment effect under full rollout ($\tau = 1.0$) was only 0.3 percentage points (0.208 vs 0.205), proving standard microeconometric trials overestimate nationwide impact by over 1,700%.Observational StudyEducationShort-Run Capacity Externality DynamicsModel proves negative externalities on non-recipients are confined to short-run capacity bottlenecks and fixed-cost reallocations, whereas long-run free market entry eliminates negative welfare impacts if vouchers equal or stay below public per-student costs.Expert Theory