Tag
11 cards
Generated exogenous cross-village coverage variation ranging from 0% to 53% for cultivators and 0% to 100% for landless laborers, with zero statistically significant correlation to village size, caste concentration, or number of castes after conditioning on eligibility shares.
Conditioning on eligibility population shares eliminates endogeneity bias, reducing correlations between insurance marketing proportions and village characteristics (such as caste concentration and total households) to statistically insignificant levels (p-values > 0.33).
A 1 standard deviation increase in rainfall increases harvest labor demand by 3.3 days more for insured cultivators than uninsured cultivators (a 22% relative increase) [8]. A 10% increase in insured cultivators lowers drought wages by 33% at the 20th percentile of rainfall, but raises wages by 29% at the 80th percentile of rainfall [9].
Joint coverage eliminates net market wage volatility relative to a no-insurance baseline, while increasing median rainfall wages by 11.7% and 80th percentile rainfall wages by 19%.
Simultaneously marketing rainfall insurance to both cultivators and laborers eliminates excess wage volatility relative to a no-insurance baseline, while increasing average daily wages by 11.7% at median rainfall and by 19.0% at the 80th percentile of rainfall.
At baseline French market tightness ($\theta = 0.42$), displacement externalities reduce net aggregate job creation to 68%–73% of the measured firm-level treatment impact ($ED(\sigma)/\sigma AB \approx 0.68\text{--}0.73$), demonstrating that equilibrium spillover losses offset roughly 27%–32% of firm-level hiring gains.
Marketing insurance exclusively to cultivators reduces drought wages for landless laborers by 0.63 log points at the 30th percentile of rainfall, demonstrating that partial-equilibrium evaluations miss severe welfare losses among non-treated groups.
In India's NREGA, 80 percent of the total earnings increase for participants resulted from higher private sector wages rather than direct program transfers. In Ethiopia, public works rollouts increased private sector wages by 9 to 18 percent by reducing private sector labor supply.
Marketing insurance solely to cultivators (25.6% coverage) reduces drought wages by 0.63 log points at the 30th percentile of rainfall and 0.23 log points at median rainfall [27]. Jointly offering insurance to both cultivators (25.6%) and laborers (31.8%) eliminates wage volatility, raising median rainfall wages by 11.7% and 80th percentile wages by 19% [30].
The theoretical framework demonstrates that under linear-in-means peer assumptions, student re-sorting does not alter aggregate population test scores ($\bar{Y} = \beta_0 \bar{X} + \beta_1 \bar{X}$); individual gains are strictly offset by losses to non-participants unless $\beta_2 > 0$.
Model proves negative externalities on non-recipients are confined to short-run capacity bottlenecks and fixed-cost reallocations, whereas long-run free market entry eliminates negative welfare impacts if vouchers equal or stay below public per-student costs.