Tag
contract_design
7 findings
Finance & microfinanceHistorical Rainfall Moment Matching in Index Contract DesignHistorical mean daily rainfall (4.18 mm vs 4.12 mm, t = -0.11) and historical coefficient of variation (0.868 vs 0.845, t = -0.16) were statistically indistinguishable between payout and non-payout villages, confirming that 2011 payouts were driven by exogenous weather shocks rather than baseline risk differences.Observational StudyLabour & employmentContract Incentive Distortion in Outsourced Placement ServicesContract payments were structured as 30% upfront fixed payment, 35% upon job placement, and 35% if employment lasted at least six months. Private providers produced significantly smaller placement impacts on the most employable job candidates and applied sanctions to inactive job seekers significantly less frequently than public services.RCTDevelopmentDelayed Monsoon Index Contract ArchitectureContract payouts triggered in 4 villages in Andhra Pradesh, dispensing tiered indemnity cash payouts of Rs. 300, Rs. 750, or Rs. 1,200 per unit purchased depending on the duration of monsoon delay.RCTEconomics (general)Delayed Monsoon Onset Index Contract ArchitecturePayouts ranged from Rs. 300 (15-day delay) to Rs. 1,200 (25-day delay) per unit; 14–15% of the sample households experienced qualified payouts across 4 Andhra Pradesh villages during the 2011 Kharif season.RCTFinance & microfinanceIndividual Liability in Group Lending SettingsAll 169 loan groups operated under individual liability with fortnightly meeting schedules, demonstrating that grace period investment gains occurred independently of joint liability financial obligations.RCTLabour & employmentMonopsonistic Employer Profit MaximizationEmployers maximize profit by offering the lowest piece rate (5 MWK) combined with quality monitoring, exploiting low worker bargaining power. For male workers, monitoring at low piece rates increases employer profit by nearly 50% compared to unmonitored contracts.RCTFinance & microfinanceUnderinvestment via Contract DesignStandard rigid microfinance contracts achieve high repayment rates (over 95%) but induce underinvestment by constraining borrowers to low-yielding liquid projects, forfeiting an average 41.0% increase in long-run weekly profits (Rs 640.9 top-coded).Expert Theory