Tag
moral_hazard
6 findings
Labour & employmentVoluntary Quit Benefit SanctioningJob seekers voluntarily leaving employment or education face a strict 5-week sanction period during which no UI transfers are disbursed, defining eligibility parameters for unemployment duration tracking.Observational StudyLabour & employmentContract Incentive Distortion in Outsourced Placement ServicesContract payments were structured as 30% upfront fixed payment, 35% upon job placement, and 35% if employment lasted at least six months. Private providers produced significantly smaller placement impacts on the most employable job candidates and applied sanctions to inactive job seekers significantly less frequently than public services.RCTFinance & microfinanceExogenous Indexing for Moral Hazard EliminationLinking payouts strictly to third-party automated rain gauges eliminated individual claims verification costs and completely removed moral hazard and adverse selection incentives.Expert TheoryFinance & microfinanceMicrocredit Asymmetric Information Market FailureMicrofinance institutions require charging a 38% APR (up from 17.5% baseline) to break even under adverse selection. No zero-profit separating equilibrium exists if moral hazard elasticity exceeds 0.46, leaving regular rigid contracts as constrained efficient for lenders.Expert TheoryFinance & microfinanceMoral Hazard Repayment ElasticityWhen moral hazard elasticity exceeds 0.46 (percentage fall in repayment per 1 percentage point rise in interest rate), no zero-profit separating equilibrium exists for grace period credit contracts.Expert TheoryEducationMulti-Task Moral Hazard Trade-offObjective incentives reduced student love of learning (p = 0.08) and overall socio-emotional development relative to subjective incentives by 0.05 standard deviations (p < 0.10), while increasing student desire to leave the school by 0.086 standard deviations (p < 0.10).RCT