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Risk aversion is negatively correlated with stated willingness to pay (p < 0.05) and shows no positive effect on actual uptake (marginal effect = -0.00285, p > 0.10), confirming theoretical models where basis risk reverses standard expected utility predictions.
Recruiters overwhelmingly reported that risk management drives screening; negative past experiences with single foreign-experienced hires caused recruiters to categorically penalize subsequent applicants of similar ethnicities, prioritizing safety over peak potential productivity.
Offering index insurance induced cultivators to increase harvest labor demand by 0.654 days per mm/day of excess rainfall (t = 2.39), representing a 22% relative increase in labor demand sensitivity under favorable rainfall conditions.
Reducing frequent mm deficit payouts lowered willingness to pay by Rs. 11.90 (despite a modest expected value drop of Rs. 10–20), whereas raising the catastrophic exit threshold increased willingness to pay by only Rs. 10.86 (despite a massive expected value increase of Rs. 40–70).
The grace period contract increased monthly profits for risk-averse clients (48.5% of the sample) by 92.0% (Rs 1,207.7 to Rs 1,543.6 higher profits, p < 0.05), whereas risk-loving clients experienced no statistically significant additional profit gain (interaction coefficient -Rs 1,243.5 to -Rs 1,557.9).
Reducing signal variance ($\sigma^2$) strictly increases both the unconditional hiring probability $\Phi\left(\frac{-0.5r\sigma^2}{\sqrt{1+\sigma^2}}\right)$ and expected match quality, provided the firm's absolute risk aversion coefficient $r < 1.2533$.