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Insurance coverage leads cultivators to increase total agricultural investment expenditures by 18.6% and allocate 12.3% more land area to cash crops and high-yield variety seeds relative to uninsured control farmers.
Among literate farmers, assignment to the insurance treatment group increased cash crop investment likelihood by 15 percentage points, whereas among illiterate farmers, the treatment effect was statistically indistinguishable from zero [11, 13].
Sales failed entirely in 11 out of 34 treatment cooperatives (32.4%) due in part to indirect, distorted communication passed through extension agents and model farmers, leaving farmers confused about policy terms.
Insurance provision drove investment increases strictly on the extensive margin (shifting non-cash-crop farmers to positive production, p = 0.041) with a discrete jump once positive planting occurred, but had zero impact on the intensive margin for top-tier producers.
High expected return technologies (hybrid seeds and fertilizers) suffer from low adoption because input costs (Rs. 5,000–9,000/ha) represent non-recoverable losses when severe rainfall shortages occur.
Prior to intervention, uncommon management practices had a 98.5% non-adoption rate, driven by lack of awareness (64.0%) and incorrect profitability beliefs (30.9%). Providing management information decreased uncommon practice non-adoption by 35.3 percentage points after 9 months.
Baseline BVR management practice scores correlated at 0.404 (p = 0.077) with the paper's 38 binary practice index across experimental firms, successfully capturing systematic productivity differences across countries and firms.
Risk credit constraint significantly decreases the probability of purchasing inorganic fertilizer (coefficient = -0.275, p < 0.01). Quantity credit constraint also significantly reduces fertilizer purchase probability (coefficient = -0.251, p < 0.01).