Primogeniture Selection Penalty in Family Firms

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In Simple Words

Appointing the eldest son to run a major company simply because he was born first is like appointing the doctor's eldest son to perform surgery regardless of whether he went to medical school.

Observed manufacturing firms

Externally owned firms
Comparison group
Eldest-son succession firms
Lower management scores

Earlier four-country survey, reported in 2006. Adjusted association; not proof that succession caused lower scores.

See source →Management survey — Bloom and Van Reenen ↗

Research question

Passing chief executive positions automatically to the eldest son (primogeniture) rather than selecting managers based on talent leads to severe underperformance and lower management scores in family-owned businesses.

Participants

6,000 medium-sized manufacturing firms across North America, Europe, Asia, and South America.

Study Design

Comparative empirical analysis of management scores between family-owned firms with professional external CEOs versus family-owned firms with eldest-son CEOs.

Results

Family firms that select CEOs based on primogeniture systematically score lower on management practices than professionalized family firms or non-family enterprises.

Takeaway

Separate family equity ownership from executive hiring decisions by selecting chief executive officers through competitive, merit-based external recruitment.

Source and citation

See source →

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