Voucher subsidies reward private spring owners based on actual user demand, leveraging local owner knowledge about which springs are worth protecting.

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Research steps

Model voucher-funded spring access

  1. Set per-trip voucher subsidy
  2. Model vouchers replacing household cash
  3. Model owner protection and redemption

Illustrative summary of the source-described voucher policy in structural simulations, not an implemented programme. Households pay no top-up fee; owners choose whether to protect springs and redeem vouchers. No simulated result is shown.

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How

When to use

Private water infrastructure investment is under-provided because landowners cannot capture full consumer surplus without setting distorted prices. Public planners need a mechanism to incentivize private infrastructure protection while keeping water free for rural households.

Implement a public water voucher subsidy mechanism to incentivize private infrastructure investment while preserving free household access.

  1. Policy makers establish a fixed voucher subsidy payment per water collection trip redeemed by spring owners.
  2. Policy makers distribute water vouchers directly to eligible rural households.
  3. Policy makers prohibit participating private spring owners from charging top-up user fees to households.
  4. Households collect water from protected springs and give vouchers to spring owners instead of cash.
  5. Spring owners choose whether to protect springs and redeem collected vouchers for government payments.

Why it works

Restricting top-up pricing prevents price distortions, ensuring households continue collecting clean water without resorting to dirtier free sources.

Example

In structural simulations across 184 spring communities in western Kenya, a government voucher subsidy of 0.0012 US dollars per trip induced profit-maximizing private owners to protect 11 percent of springs, generating 124 US dollars in net welfare gains per spring after accounting for a 30 percent tax deadweight loss.

About the study

Participants

Counterfactual simulations across 184 viable spring communities serving rural households in Busia and Butere-Mumias districts, Kenya.

Study Design

Backward-induction equilibrium simulation modeling household discrete choice demand, private profit maximization, and uniform voucher pricing with a 30 percent deadweight loss of taxation.

Results

A neoclassical policy maker sets a voucher price of 0.0012 US dollars per trip, prompting 11% of spring owners to protect springs and achieving 124 US dollars in net welfare gains per spring; a paternalistic policy maker sets a price of 0.0032 US dollars per trip, inducing 46% protection.

Source

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