Try, learn and adjust
Check conservation auctions follow bid rankings
- Plan: Invite Amina and other landholders to submit sealed bids for planting and caring for trees.
- Try: Rank compensation per tree from lowest to highest; award requested rates until the budget is exhausted.
- Learn: Review awards and tree survival: do awarded contracts follow the bid ranking and budget?
- Adjust: Keep ranking-based awards for the next auction if followed. Change allocation checks where awards depart from the ranking.
Illustrative: Amina is fictional. School’s suggested learning loop, not the source study’s tested protocol.
See source →School’s suggested, untested loop. Observe bids, awards, budget, planting and tree survival; do not invent a saving per tree.
How
When to use
Uniform fixed payments cause program managers to overpay landholders who would accept lower compensation. Setting fixed prices inflates project budgets without increasing environmental outcomes. Using competitive auctions allows managers to allocate contracts based on participants' actual compensation requirements.
Allocate conservation contracts using a competitive auction where landholders bid the lowest payment they require to participate.
- Invite prospective landholders to submit sealed bids specifying their required compensation to plant and care for trees.
- Rank all submitted bids from lowest compensation per tree to highest.
- Select landholders with the lowest bids until the allocated conservation budget is exhausted.
- Award conservation contracts to winning bidders at their requested compensation rates.
- Monitor tree planting and survival across enrolled land parcels to enforce contract terms.
Why it works
This avoids overpayment and increases compliance rates among participants.
Example
Researchers tested auctioning PES contracts for a tree planting program in Malawi, finding that competitive bidding lowered costs per surviving tree and increased contract compliance compared to fixed pricing.
About the study
Participants
Human landholders participating in a tree planting program in Malawi.
Study Design
Randomized Controlled Trial evaluating competitive procurement auctions against standard fixed-price contract allocations.
Results
Using competitive bidding in an auction to allocate PES contracts led to lower costs per surviving tree and higher rates of compliance.