Research procedure
Elicit transfer bonus requests
- Present target schools and pay contracts
- Record minimum bonuses; rank requests for openings
- Contact lowest bidders first; pay stated bid on transfer
Illustrative summary of the source-described first-price transfer auction. Hypothetical school scenarios carry real stakes: lower requests receive priority if an opening arises. No transfer is guaranteed.
See source →How
When to use
Schools struggle to measure employees' willingness to transfer across locations or pay structures without exposing the organization to excessive transfer costs. Hypothetical survey questions about job moves suffer from cheap talk and overstate actual mobility. This method uses an incentivized auction to elicit employees' true minimum monetary compensation required to switch workplaces.
Elicit employees' true willingness to accept job transfers using a first-price auction mechanism with real organizational consequences.
- Present employees with hypothetical transfer scenarios to specific target branches offering performance pay or flat pay contracts.
- Ask employees to state the exact minimum salary bonus required to induce them to transfer to each specified branch.
- Inform participants that stated transfer bonus requests determine priority ranking for actual job openings at those branches.
- Rank all applicants by their stated transfer bonus amounts for any open position that arises.
- Contact applicants with the lowest willingness to accept bids first in case of an opening and pay them their stated bid amount upon transfer.
Why it works
The first-price auction structure discourages inflated bids because higher demands reduce the probability of winning a desired transfer option.
Example
Researchers administered a first-price auction transfer survey to private school teachers in Pakistan during the spring 2019 endline assessment. Teachers specified the exact bonus needed to transfer to specific neighboring schools with flat or performance pay contracts. Teachers who stated a lower willingness to accept bonus were prioritized for actual transfer openings and received their stated bonus upon moving.
About the study
Participants
Core subject teachers across private schools in Pakistan completing the spring 2019 endline online survey; sample teachers averaged 35 years of age and 81 percent were female.
Study Design
Survey-based first-price auction mechanism integrated into the endline survey of a multi-year randomized controlled trial to measure job switching costs and transfer preferences under real stakes.
Results
Stated transfer bonuses revealed that switching costs across schools within the same campus average \$560, while switching across districts averages \$1,120; these job switching costs reduce overall teacher sorting across schools by roughly half compared to zero-cost contract choices.