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School Inputs, Household Substitution, and Test Scores

Original source

Jishnu Das; Stefan Dercon; James Habyarimana; Pramila Krishnan; Karthik Muralidharan; Venkatesh Sundararaman

School Inputs, Household Substitution, and Test Scores (2013)

Published research article · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(2), 29–57

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Use demographic catchment size boundaries as exogenous instruments when estimating per-capita public transfer impacts in fixed-grant administrative settings.

"We therefore use the size of the eligible cohort in the catchment area as an instrument for school enrollment, and therefore the level of per-student cash grants..."

Evaluate household-level liquidity and non-educational expenditure needs when designing in-kind educational subsidies for low-income populations.

"With credit constraints, anticipated increases in school spending will alleviate the overall and period-specific budget constraint of the household resulting in greater current spending on all goods, including education."

Extend impact evaluation timeframes beyond initial implementation periods to allow household and organizational reoptimization before declaring program efficacy.

"...the interpretation of experimental coefficients depends on the time horizon of the evaluation and whether this was long enough for other agents to reoptimize their own inputs."

Monitor direct behavioral effort metrics, such as teacher attendance and active instruction time, across multi-year field trials to empirically rule out temporary observer effects and gift-exchange dynamics.

"There are no differences in teacher absence or teaching activity across treatment and control groups in either Y1 or Y2 or within treatment schools across Y1 and Y2."

Structure educational grant programs so funding is either unpredictable or restricted to non-fungible services that households cannot independently purchase and offset.

"Evaluated at the mean, we find that for each dollar provided to treatment schools in the second year, household spending declines by 0.76 dollars."

Incorporate non-education household budget preferences and implied income elasticities when modeling consumer response to in-kind public education transfers.

"The data suggest that parents are not behaving irrationally, and that the extent of the offset yields an estimate of income elasticity of education spending between 1.8 and 4.6..."

Design targeted grant thresholds that exceed baseline private household expenditures when attempting to increase net consumption of specific educational inputs.

"We verify this by looking at household spending on education in the control schools and find that only 12 percent of households report spending less than Rs 125/year (the value of the grant) on their child's education, suggesting that the grant was inframarginal for most households and could be offset easily."

Shift public education investments toward structural pedagogical reorganizations, such as ability grouping, rather than standalone material provisions.

"Another example may be investments in improving classroom pedagogical processes, such as tracking children based on ability..."

Distribute public educational grants through flexible or discretionary allocation channels when the policy goal is to generate immediate net gains in student learning.

"Variation in rule-based, well-publicized sources of funding are not correlated with test score gains, while less predictable funding sources are."

Direct public education investments toward high-skill human capital and structural classroom organization rather than easily substitutable consumer materials.

"In a parallel experiment on the provision of an extra contract teacher to randomly selected schools in Andhra Pradesh... the impact of the extra teacher was identical in both the first and second year of the project, suggesting that teacher inputs were less likely to be substituted away."

Account for empirical decay rates when modeling multi-year returns on educational investments to avoid overestimating long-term impact from short-term baseline gains.

"The size of gains after two years (with point estimates below the point estimates after Y1) suggests that the second year of block grants did not add much to learning outcomes, while decay of earlier gains may explain why average gains (in terms of point estimates) after Y2 are smaller than achieved after Y1."

Deploy emergency or non-recurrent school improvement grants as unexpected one-time allocations to prevent private expenditure reductions during early implementation phases.

"Evidence from India and Zambia shows that student test scores are higher when schools receive unanticipated grants, but there is no impact of grants that are anticipated."