Jordan Compact Policy Framework
Observational StudyClinical Trial
Host countries often enforce strict legal restrictions preventing refugees from securing formal employment, trapping displaced populations in poverty and informal labor markets.
Picture this
Imagine a country opening its gated neighborhood pool to non-residents only after neighboring cities agree to fund pool maintenance and lower local trade tariffs. International aid packages and trade benefits act as incentives that persuade host governments to grant official legal work permits to refugees, unlocking formal employment access.
What the evidence says
Eased administrative procedures in manufacturing, agriculture, and construction to issue up to 200,000 work permits, establishing a global model for refugee economic integration later adopted in Ethiopia.
- Who was studied
- Target quota of 200,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan out of 660,000 registered refugees (93% below national poverty line); evaluated alongside N = 1,663 Syrian refugees in urban Amman, Irbid, and Mafraq.
- How
- Policy framework analysis evaluating legal work permit access combined with donor trade concessions ($2.1 billion in direct grants, $1.9 billion in concessional loans).
What to do
Structure international humanitarian assistance by linking trade concessions and concessional financing to host-country policy commitments that issue formal work permits to refugees.
From the source
"Under the Compact, donors pledged a total of US$2.1 billion in direct grants and US$1.9 billion in concessional loans... In exchange, the Government of Jordan committed to important policy changes... providing work permits for up to 200,000 Syrian refugees."
An_Adaptive_Targeted_Field_Experiment_Job_Search_Assistance_for.pdf