Jordan Compact Policy Framework

Download image · 1200 × 630 PNG

In Simple Words

Imagine a country opening its gated neighborhood pool to non-residents only after neighboring cities agree to fund pool maintenance and lower local trade tariffs. International aid packages and trade benefits act as incentives that persuade host governments to grant official legal work permits to refugees, unlocking formal employment access.

Research question

Host countries often enforce strict legal restrictions preventing refugees from securing formal employment, trapping displaced populations in poverty and informal labor markets.

Participants

Target quota of 200,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan out of 660,000 registered refugees (93% below national poverty line); evaluated alongside N = 1,663 Syrian refugees in urban Amman, Irbid, and Mafraq.

Study Design

Policy framework analysis evaluating legal work permit access combined with donor trade concessions ($2.1 billion in direct grants, $1.9 billion in concessional loans).

Results

Eased administrative procedures in manufacturing, agriculture, and construction to issue up to 200,000 work permits, establishing a global model for refugee economic integration later adopted in Ethiopia.

Takeaway

Structure international humanitarian assistance by linking trade concessions and concessional financing to host-country policy commitments that issue formal work permits to refugees.

Source and citation

From the source

"Under the Compact, donors pledged a total of US$2.1 billion in direct grants and US$1.9 billion in concessional loans... In exchange, the Government of Jordan committed to important policy changes... providing work permits for up to 200,000 Syrian refugees."

Original source reference

An_Adaptive_Targeted_Field_Experiment_Job_Search_Assistance_for

The original reference is reproduced as recorded. Full publication details have not been independently verified.

Related findings