Dual-Mechanism Ambiguity in Marriage Market Earning Spillovers
RCTReview
Increases in female earning potential produce opposing pressures in traditional marriage markets: groom families increase demand for working brides to capture extra household income, while natal families delay marriage to retain the daughter's earnings or human capital [7].
Picture this
Think of a rare vintage car whose market price suddenly jumps; buyers want to purchase it immediately because it is more valuable, but the owner wants to keep it longer to enjoy driving it themselves [7]. Higher potential wages make a young woman more attractive as a prospective bride to groom families, but simultaneously convince her natal parents to hold off on arranging her marriage so she can work or study longer [7].
What to do
Account for competing incentives between groom demand and natal family retention when modeling the net impact of female wage shocks on age at marriage.
From the source
> "If women can work after marriage, BPO jobs might increase the demand for younger brides... though parents may be more reluctant to part early with their daughters for the very same reason. Therefore, the net effect on age at marriage is perhaps more ambiguous." [7]
Do Labor Market Opportunities Affect Young Women's Work and Family Decisions? Experimental Evidence from India