Stated valuation modules isolate individual security preferences from credit constraints and reveal how local social collusion concerns depress demand for village-based guards.

Download image · 1200 × 630 PNG

Research survey

Measure stated willingness to pay for guards

  1. Ask weekly willingness to pay for guard profiles
  2. Compare baseline and post-deployment valuations
  3. Compare stated values with market wages

Illustrative summary of the source-described contingent-valuation survey of 585 farmers in 76 Kenyan villages. Values are self-reported, not actual payments. Guard categories differ between the procedure and findings, so no category comparison is shown.

See source →

How

When to use

Rural smallholders often under-value formal or informal property protection services due to liquidity constraints or low market exposure. Evaluating farmer demand across different guard profiles helps program designers determine cost-recovery potential and identify preferences for outsider versus local security.

Measure farmer willingness to pay for alternative security guard configurations using structured contingent valuation survey modules.

  1. Present survey respondents with hypothetical weekly hiring scenarios for three distinct security guard categories: local friends, local non-friends, and outsider Maasai watchmen.
  2. Elicit self-reported weekly willingness to pay in local currency for each guard profile using standardized open-ended valuation questions.
  3. Compare baseline willingness to pay values against post-deployment endline valuations to capture changes in guard valuation after experiencing security benefits.
  4. Calculate willingness to pay differentials across guard profiles to isolate the specific valuation premium placed on outsider status versus ethnic pastoralist stereotypes.
  5. Contrast stated willingness to pay against actual market watchman wages to determine the required subsidy or cost-sharing gap for program sustainability.

Why it works

Comparing valuations across guard profiles quantifies the economic value farmers assign to non-collusive outsider status and cultural enforcement reputations.

Example

Researchers elicited self-reported weekly willingness to pay for watchmen from 585 smallholders in Migori County, Kenya. Farmers reported a willingness to pay of roughly 200 KES/week for local friends, 380 KES/week for local non-friends, and 650 KES/week for outsider Maasai watchmen, demonstrating a significant premium for non-collusive outsider security.

About the study

Participants

585 smallholding farmers across 76 villages in Suna East, Suna West, and Uriri sub-counties, Migori County, Kenya.

Study Design

Survey-based contingent valuation module administered at baseline and endline to measure weekly willingness to pay across three guard categories (local friends, local non-friends, and outsider Maasai).

Results

Stated willingness to pay for Maasai watchmen (~650 KES/week) was significantly higher than for non-local non-Maasai guards (~380 KES/week, p < 0.001) and local friends (~200 KES/week, p < 0.001), while actual experimental treatment increased post-trial guard valuation across 90% of respondents, with 55% intending to hire guards in the next season.

Source

See source →