Source · aikyam school

Public Information is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections

Original source

Abhijit Banerjee; Nils Enevoldsen; Rohini Pande; Michael Walton

Public Information is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections (2021)

Working paper

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Midterm disclosures establish the credibility of upcoming pre-election evaluation campaigns and make performance metrics salient to politicians early in their tenure.

Featuring candidates together on the same page allows voters to compare incumbent performance against local peers facing similar municipal constraints.

Mass media public disclosures enhance retrospective electoral accountability by providing poorly informed voters with credible candidate performance data.

Private disclosures provide actionable information about localized public good failures to politicians who may be intrinsically motivated or unaware of specific infrastructure defects.