Source · aikyam school

Estimating Equilibrium Effects of Job Search Assistance

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Pieter Gautier; Paul Muller; Bas van der Klaauw; Michael Rosholm; Michael Svarer

Estimating Equilibrium Effects of Job Search Assistance

Dated research draft · Version date: 16 July 2012

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Structure job search assistance programs with mandatory, early-stage participation milestones to leverage deterrence incentives that accelerate independent job search.

"Graversen and Van Ours (2008) find that the threat effect and job search assistance are most effective. ... They show that the effect of the activation program is largest for individuals with the longest travel time to the program location."

Incorporate ex-post Bertrand wage competition into equilibrium search models when evaluating labor market programs that increase simultaneous job offer probabilities per worker.

"In Bertrand competition workers with one offer receive their reservation wage or the minimum wage while workers with multiple offers receive the full match surplus."

Evaluate active labor market interventions by comparing non-treated individuals in treatment regions to external control populations rather than relying on internal regional control groups.

"Using a difference-in-difference model we show that the nonparticipants in the experiment regions find jobs slower after the introduction of the activation program (relative to workers in other regions)."

Account for non-monetary leisure loss costs imposed by mandatory activation compliance when estimating worker reservation wage changes and wage bargaining outcomes.

"The activation program consists of meetings with caseworkers and a job search assistance program which are both time-consuming for participants. We assume that this eliminates the value of non-market time, h."

Specify matching functions with explicit dual-coordination friction parameters to model non-linear matching returns under policy-induced search effort spikes.

"There are two coordination frictions affecting job finding: (i) workers do not know where other workers apply, and (ii) firms do not know which candidates are considered by other firms... More applications per worker reduce the first coordination problem mentioned above but amplify the second one."

Adjust baseline policy treatment intensity parameters for negative duration dependence and cohort inflow dynamics before estimating general equilibrium search models.

"If we take into account that the exit rate declines during the spell of unemployment, the fraction of program participants among the stock of unemployed workers reduces to about 26 percent."

Track aggregate monthly job opening postings following labor policy interventions to measure firm creation responses before concluding that job search assistance only reshuffles existing jobs.

"The parameter estimates reported in column (3) show that indeed during the experiment the stock of vacancies started to increase in the experiment regions compared to other regions. This effect peaked in May/June, so three to four months after the random assignment stopped..."

Simulate large-scale policy rollouts using structurally estimated equilibrium search models before scaling active labor market interventions nationwide.

"This model shows that a large scale role out of the activation program decreases welfare, while a standard partial microeconometric cost-benefit analysis would conclude the opposite."

Calibrate structural general equilibrium parameters by matching reduced-form experimental treatment effect moments using indirect inference.

"To estimate the structural model parameters, we use the method of indirect inference. The main idea is to use an auxiliary statistical model to capture features of the data, and to estimate the parameters of the structural model by matching the auxiliary parameters estimated from real data with those estimated from simulated data."

Include non-pecuniary leisure time losses alongside pecuniary administration costs when calculating the total economic cost of mandatory job search activation policies.

"The benefit of the program is that it reduces the costs of making job applications to $\gamma_{1}<\gamma_{0}$. ... The leisure costs of participating in the activation program are over one percent of productivity or almost two percent of the unemployment benefits level."

Verify that regional mobility rates across experimental administrative borders are sufficiently low before treating local geographic units as self-contained labor markets.

"However, the Danish research council (2002) reports that within a year only one percent of the Danish unemployed and 1.4 percent of the employed workers move location."

Distinguish microeconometric trial treatment effects from policy-relevant general equilibrium treatment effects before scaling localized experimental programs.

"The evaluation of the randomized experiment estimates a treatment effect on the matching rates equal to 0.245-0.191=0.054... However, as we mentioned before the policy relevant treatment effect is E[m(a1*; a, θ)|τ=1]-E[m(a0*; a, θ)|τ=0], which is 0.208-0.205=0.003."

Apply stratified partial likelihood proportional hazard models using non-experiment comparison regions to isolate non-treated spillover effects without imposing parametric hazard assumptions.

"The key advantage of stratified partial likelihood estimation is that it does not require any functional form restriction on the duration dependence pattern... The effect of the presence of the activation program on the nonparticipants in the program is a reduction in the exit rate of about five percent."

Utilize micro-founded matching functions with variable coordination frictions rather than aggregate Cobb-Douglas forms when predicting labor policy effects across regional markets.

"We model the matching process between workers and vacancies using an urn-ball matching function... this matching function microfounds the presence of congestion externalities among searchers."

Cap mandatory active labor market policy participation rates at optimal equilibrium thresholds (~20-30%) rather than mandating universal 100% coverage across all unemployed individuals.

"A cost-benefit analysis indicates that government expenditures are minimized when about 30 percent of the workers participate in the activation program, while welfare is maximized when around 20 percent of the workers participate in the program."

Birthdates are determined at birth and cannot be altered or manipulated by job seekers or caseworkers seeking favorable assignment.

Frequent mandatory meetings lower the cost of finding job opportunities through direct caseworker referrals while increasing search effort through monitoring and reducing the value of non-market leisure time.

Heightened job search effort from activated workers increases vacancy filling probabilities and reduces reservation wages, prompting firms to post additional job vacancies.

The intensive course reduces the individual cost of submitting job applications and provides structured guidance that speeds up job matching.