Source · aikyam school

Imperfect Competition and Sanitation: Evidence from Randomized Auctions in Senegal

Original source

Jean-François Houde; Terence Johnson; Molly Lipscomb; Laura Schechter

Imperfect Competition and Sanitation: Evidence from Randomized Auctions in Senegal (2022)

Working paper

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Broadcasting winning prices gives participating operators continuous feedback on market-clearing rates, accelerating price learning and helping competitive firms identify winning price levels across different neighborhoods.

Bayesian shrinkage weights raw estimates by their statistical precision, pulling noisy fixed effects derived from fewer observations closer to the group mean.

Assuming unobserved household and environmental cost attributes vary continuously across municipality borders, sharp price discontinuities at the boundary isolate the effect of trade association price-setting from underlying spatial demand.

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Repeated panel visits capture seasonal variations and long-term changes in household desludging frequency, pricing, and technology choices.