Source · aikyam school

Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico's Labor Courts

Original source

Joyce Sadka; Enrique Seira; Christopher Woodruff

Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico's Labor Courts (2020)

Working paper

Search for this source ↗

Permission for School’s use is unestablished.

Used in these cards

Providing objective statistical evidence directly to workers reduces excessive optimism regarding trial payouts and corrects legal misinformation.

Providing general procedural awareness tests whether reminding litigants of conciliation services encourages dispute resolution without altering case-specific expectations.

Presenting simplified settlement benchmarks directly to workers debiases excessive optimism early in the judicial process.

Machine learning algorithms systematically uncover complex empirical relationships across thousands of past court rulings that human litigants cannot calculate.

Informing workers before hiring private lawyers debiases excessive optimism when workers are still free to negotiate directly.