Source · aikyam school

An Experiment in Candidate Selection

Original source

Katherine Casey; Abou Bakarr Kamara; Niccoló F. Meriggi

An Experiment in Candidate Selection (2021)

Journal article · American Economic Review · 2021, 111(5): 1575–1612

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Direct face-to-face notification reduces information friction by providing citizens with clear, timely details about debate schedules.

Directly asking candidates for self-reported fee breakdowns and cross-checking estimates with unsuccessful aspirants yields empirical data on informal political costs.

Systematically tracking past project delivery provides a verifiable proxy for candidate competence and public service commitment.

Physical field audits verify self-reported expenditure, preventing legislators from overstating their accomplishments.

Random sampling from official registration logs prevents convenience bias and gives every registered citizen an equal probability of selection.

Representative polling eliminates information constraints by revealing true constituent preferences directly to party leaders.

Self-reported claims of honesty and attention to detail suffer from social desirability bias.

Measuring elite misperception reveals that party leaders often operate under misplaced confidence regarding constituent opinion.