Source · aikyam school

Risk, Insurance and Wages in General Equilibrium

Original source

Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak; Mark Rosenzweig

Risk, Insurance and Wages in General Equilibrium

Working paper · National Bureau of Economic Research · NBER Working Paper 19811 · Version date: January 2014

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© 2014 by Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak and Mark Rosenzweig. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

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Tailor weather index trigger thresholds to local historical rainfall distributions to maintain uniform actuarial pricing and prevent spatial selection bias across implementation sites.

Subsidize weather index premiums for low-income households to prevent ex-ante negative income shocks during non-trigger years while maintaining strong ex-post shock protection.

Deploy localized micro-weather sensor networks or satellite-derived precipitation indexes to minimize spatial basis risk and increase voluntary insurance adoption.

Use sub-group or caste stratification when designing large-scale randomized evaluations to generate exogenous market-level treatment intensity without confounding market-level characteristics.

Design general equilibrium field experiments by randomizing treatment across social network sub-units of varying sizes to generate exogenous community-level coverage variation.

Calculate the wage sensitivity ratio across favorable and unfavorable weather states before rolling out index insurance exclusively to agricultural asset owners.

Provide formal weather index insurance to landowning farmers to incentivize high-yield agricultural investments while concurrently implementing labor market buffers for rural wage workers.

Bundle weather index insurance with agricultural extension services to accelerate smallholder transition toward high-yield commercial crops.

Structure micro-agricultural weather insurance contracts using multi-tiered objective onset delay triggers to provide rapid liquidity during planting delays.

Structure weather index insurance contracts around phase-specific cumulative rainfall thresholds rather than seasonal totals to provide timely liquidity during planting and germination shocks.

Incorporate demographic wage differentials into baseline labor market models when evaluating household income shocks and gendered welfare impacts in agrarian settings.

Implement dual-side marketing of agricultural index insurance to both land-owning farmers and landless wage laborers simultaneously to prevent equilibrium wage destabilization.

Market weather index insurance contracts simultaneously to both agricultural employer and laborer populations within the same local labor market.

Distinguish between ex-ante planting labor and ex-post harvest labor when evaluating labor market impacts of agricultural risk management policies.

Combine weather insurance products with agricultural extension services to encourage farmers to adopt weather-sensitive, high-yield input bundles.

Incorporate general equilibrium market price and wage estimations into program evaluation designs before scaling social or financial interventions.

Account for labor-supply-driven wage spillovers when evaluating the cost-effectiveness and broader welfare impacts of microinsurance interventions in informal labor markets.

Integrate rural banking and transportation infrastructure development alongside crop insurance programs to establish systemic wage stability in weather-exposed agrarian regions.

Construct paved access roads and bus transport stops in rural communities to provide wage workers with spatial mobility and dampening local wage sensitivity to weather shocks.

Repeal legal insurable interest mandates that restrict agricultural weather index insurance to land title holders, extending eligibility to landless agricultural wage laborers.

Amend microinsurance regulations to abolish the land-ownership insurable interest requirement, allowing wage laborers to purchase weather index contracts.

Market rainfall index insurance directly to landless wage laborers to allow households to maintain consumption during climate shocks without supplying distress labor.

Evaluate agricultural labor policies separately across planting and harvest stages to prevent mistaking harvest-stage labor demand shifts for planting-stage employment changes.

Evaluate agricultural interventions using village-level general equilibrium models rather than partial equilibrium individual frameworks to capture localized price and wage adjustments.

Caste membership determines local social interactions, but group sizes vary naturally across villages.

Connecting payouts to objective weather station data eliminates the need for expensive field loss verifications.

Insuring landowning farmers encourages high-yield farming investments that increase harvest labor demand during good weather, while insuring laborers provides cash payouts during drought shocks that lower emergency labor supply.