Risk, Insurance and Wages in General Equilibrium

Original source

Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak; Mark Rosenzweig

Working paper · National Bureau of Economic Research · NBER Working Paper 19811 · Version date: January 2014

Permission for School’s use is unestablished.

Full source notice

© 2014 by Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak and Mark Rosenzweig. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

Used in these cards

Historical Rainfall Moment Matching in Index Contract Design

Asymmetric Wealth Effect of Subsidized Index Contracts

Basis Risk Demand Inelasticity

Caste-Stratified Market Penetration Randomization

Caste-Stratified Village Identification Strategy

Cultivator Risk-Taking and Labor Demand Volatility

Cultivator Labor Demand Sensitivity

Cultivator Technology Adoption Shift

Delayed Monsoon Index Contract Architecture

Delayed Monsoon Onset Index Contract Architecture

Demographic Gender Premium in Unskilled Agricultural Labor

Dual-Market Side Insurance Neutrality

Dual-Sided Balanced Insurance Market Stabilization

Ex-Ante Input Complementarity vs. Ex-Post Harvest Labor Decoupling

Ex-Ante Risk Distortion in Agricultural Input Selection

General Equilibrium Program Evaluation Gap in Scaled Interventions

Indirect Wage-Mediated Insurance Externalities

Financial and Transport Infrastructure as Wage Volatility Buffers

Infrastructure Wage Shock Dampening

Insurable Interest Exclusion and GE Welfare Spillover

Insurable Interest Regulatory Exclusion

Landless Labor Supply Income Effect

Stage-Specific Labor Demand Divergence

Village Labor Market Clearing Mechanism