Source · aikyam school

The Effects of Housing Assistance on Labor Supply: Evidence from a Voucher Lottery

Original source

Brian A. Jacob; Jens Ludwig

The Effects of Housing Assistance on Labor Supply: Evidence from a Voucher Lottery (2012)

Published research article · American Economic Review, 102(1), 272–304

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Apply calibrated income (-0.09) and compensated wage (0.15) elasticities when modeling structural labor supply changes in response to means-tested transfer adjustments.

"Our simple calibration exercise suggests an income elasticity of -0.09 and a compensated wage elasticity of 0.15."

Balance the in-kind target efficiency of housing subsidies against the 19 percent earnings loss leak when deciding between targeted housing vouchers and direct cash transfers like the EITC.

"But vouchers also have the unintended consequence of reducing annual earnings by around $1,316 among program participants, around 19 percent of the value of the subsidy to voucher recipients."

Incorporate the 30 percent implicit marginal tax rate into labor supply models when designing means-tested housing assistance programs to prevent unintended employment disincentives.

"We find that among working-age, able-bodied adults, housing voucher use reduces labor force participation by around 4 percentage points (6 percent) and quarterly earnings by $329 (10 percent), and increases Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program participation by around 2 percentage points (15 percent)."

Incorporate equivalent variation discounts (0.83 benefit-to-subsidy ratio) when evaluating the consumer surplus generated by in-kind housing vouchers relative to cash transfers.

"Figure 1 from Currie and Gahvari (2008) shows that if a government program that provides people with an in-kind benefit leads the good to be overprovided, households are at the kink in their budget constraint created by the in-kind benefit..."

Evaluate pre-benefit waiting periods in social programs to capture temporary intertemporal labor supply increases prior to program enrollment.

"We also see a slight increase in average labor supply for those families who expect to receive a voucher in the future, consistent with predictions from the lifecycle labor supply model that people may shift work effort towards periods when their net wage is relatively higher."

Evaluate local unemployment rates when measuring social assistance program disincentives, as tight labor markets amplify labor reductions while weak markets constrain them.

"In contrast, it appears that weak economic conditions at the time of voucher offer might mitigate the work disincentive effects associated with a voucher offer."

Combine tenant-based vouchers with targeted mobility counseling or neighborhood location restrictions if policy objectives require neighborhood de-concentration or reduced poverty exposure.

"We find no evidence that the housing-specific mechanisms hypothesized to promote work, such as neighborhood quality or residential stability, are important empirically."

Account for overlapping welfare program phase-outs when calculating effective marginal tax rates to accurately predict behavioral responses to new housing subsidies.

"Voucher use reduces employment by 6 percentage points (9 percent) among those who were not receiving benefits at baseline, and by only 2.5 percentage points (4 percent) among those receiving benefits."

Account for pre-offer mobility delays when analyzing applicant residential turnover and neighborhood stability metrics during housing program wait-list periods.

"Figure 3... makes clear that voucher offers change the timing of moves: treatment families who expect to receive a voucher are less likely to move than controls until they are offered a voucher and then become more likely to move."

Mathematical calibration grounds abstract preference parameters in actual experimental data.

Direct landlord subsidy payments bridge the gap between low-income family earnings and market rents without requiring public housing construction.

Credit bureaus and postal services update residential records constantly whenever people apply for credit or forward mail.

Randomized placement ensures every eligible applicant receives an equal chance of assistance regardless of individual background.

Random wait-list lottery assignment creates exogenous variation in benefit offers that strongly predicts actual voucher utilization without directly affecting labor outcomes.