Source · aikyam school

Contracting for Health: Evidence from Cambodia

Original source

Erik Bloom; Elizabeth King; Indu Bhushan; Michael Kremer; David Clingingsmith; Benjamin Loevinsohn; Rathavuth Hong; J. Brad Schwartz

Contracting for Health: Evidence from Cambodia

Working paper

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Facility managers work on-site daily and understand local clinic conditions better than external central managers.

Initial random assignment is orthogonal to unobserved unit characteristics, providing a valid instrument for non-random actual treatment take-up.

Contractor management brings active supervision and performance-based salary bonuses to civil service health staff.

Full managerial autonomy lets contractors bypass slow government procurement and pay workers market wages.

Expatriate managers bring external technical expertise and operate outside local political networks.

Formalized user fees bring informal out-of-pocket payments into a monitored accounting system.

Explicit targets tie performance evaluation directly to priority maternal and child health indicators.

Direct patient follow-up prevents health workers from fabricating entries in facility registers to meet contractual targets.

Baseline civil service pay is too low to retain or motivate health staff without additional compensation.