Original source
Promotions and Productivity: The Role of Meritocracy and Pay Progression in the Public Sector (2024)
working paper
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Implement mandatory unannounced third-party audit back-checks on a random 25% sample of performance evaluation data to eliminate collusion and reporting bias.
"To limit collusion, a random 25% of households each week were "back-checked" either by phone or in-person (unannounced visits) by a team of field monitors, who asked the households to confirm the date and the type of the household visit."
Publish transparent, easily accessible public sector wage bands to eliminate widespread employee misperceptions regarding supervisor compensation.
"Column 1 shows that the mean absolute difference between perceived PS pay and the truth is 482 SLL in Tpay=1 vs. 35,320 SLL in Tpay=0."
Prioritize meritocratic civil service promotion rules in developing nations where public sector vertical pay gaps are structurally wide.
"Our findings indicate that in the public sector of developing countries, the fact that pay progression is often steeper than in higher-income countries and that promotions are less meritocratic (see Figure A.1) may constrain these government's capacity to provide high-quality public services."
Transition public sector personnel promotion criteria from discretionary manager nominations to objective, independently verified worker performance metrics.
"First, we show that a more meritocratic promotion rule increases the number of visits provided by the average worker by 22%."
Distinguish between influence activities and demotivation when diagnosing productivity drops in non-meritocratic organizations.
"Overall, the results provide suggestive evidence that, with low meritocracy, increasing pay progression reduces productivity through negative morale effects."
Implement short-term piece-rate financial bonuses alongside long-term meritocratic promotion tournaments without fearing negative motivational crowding-out between the two incentive channels.
"Accordingly, Table A.13 shows that the effects of the meritocracy and pay progression information treatments on the number of visits do not interact with the incentives treatments (column 1)."
Include pre-surveyed accurate-belief subgroups as empirical placebo controls when designing information intervention trials to rule out attention shocks.
"As a placebo check, we look at workers who correctly estimated PS pay at baseline and did not update their perception of pay progression in Tpay=1... Revealing the true PS pay has no statistically significant effect on their performance regardless of whether the system is meritocratic..."
Design meritocratic promotion evaluation metrics that combine quantitative volume with unannounced quality checks and visit duration to prevent multitasking effort distortion.
"Such a quantity-quality trade-off does not exist in our context: the average visit length increases by 15% in Tmerit=1 relative to Tmerit=0 (Table 1, column 8), routine visits increase and most of the other types of visits increase too (Table A.4), and household targeting does not change (Table A.5)."
Accurately manage employee salary expectations early to prevent incentive deflation caused by downward corrections in perceived promotion rewards.
"In the new more meritocratic regime, lower pay progression reduces the number of visits by 2.045 (-21%), while it has no significant effect in the in the old, less meritocratic regime..."
Implement objective, rule-based promotion systems to unlock latent productivity from non-politically connected frontline public sector employees who face discretionary barriers.
"We find that the meritocratic promotions treatment leads to an increase of 2.3 visits (35%) for workers not connected to the PHU in-charge (significant at the 1% level) and an increase of 0.8 visits for workers connected to the PHU in-charge... The difference between the two estimates is statistically significant at the 1% level."
Structure promotion tournaments with intermediate progression tiers or targeted incentives for workers outside immediate promotion eligibility windows to maintain broad-based workforce effort.
"Figure 2 (Panel B) and the corresponding Table 1 (column 2) show that increasing meritocracy boosts the number of visits provided by "high-rank" workers (top 3 of their PHU) by 2.348, a 38% increase relative to the average for these workers in Tmerit=0."
Distinguish vertical managerial pay gaps from horizontal peer salary disparities when evaluating employee responses to wage transparency.
"In contrast to these studies, and in line with Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2022), we shift our attention to vertical pay inequalities between upper- and lower-tier workers for which the theoretical predictions are less clear."