Original source
Health Workers’ Behavior, Patient Reporting and Reputational Concerns: Lab-in-the-Field Experimental Evidence from Kenya (2018)
IZA discussion paper · IZA Discussion Paper 11352
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Used in these cards
Baseline Reciprocity Predictor of Real-World Absenteeism
"Across all measures, health workers who are more reciprocal tend to be less absent during our unannounced visits, especially if working in the public sector."
Patient Reporting Reticence from Social Proximity
"when complaints lead to tangible consequences (either monetary or non-monetary) for providers, patients are less willing to file such complaints, mainly due to the existence of personal relationships with providers."
Peer Disclosure Accountability Mechanism
"disclosing patients' complaints to providers' professional peers increases providers' pro-social behavior toward patients as much as imposing monetary penalties based on patients' complaints;"
Provider Retaliation Threat Deterrence
"When provider retaliation is allowed, the effectiveness of the Peer Disclosure reporting system, with respect to provider reciprocity, is reduced to between 22 and 25 percentage points relative to the Complaint Box (approximately 21 to 24 percent)."
Reporting Intensity Dual-Margin Divergence
"However, conditional on filing reports, the interventions lead to greater intensity of complaints (measured by the number of cards sent)."
Public-Private Sector Motivation Heterogeneity
"public sector health workers are more generous toward patients, and more responsive to the Peer Disclosure mechanism than their private sector counterparts, whose reciprocity is only responsive to the Monetary Penalty system."
Selective Responsiveness of Unmotivated Workers to Sanctions
"less pro-social health workers, as measured in a standard Trust Game, are more responsive to the threat of both peer shaming and monetary sanctions."
Wealth-Differentiated Sanction Sensitivity in Reporting
"Focusing on the coefficients of the interaction between wealth and the treatments, we find that wealthier patients (relative to poorer patients) are more likely to complain if reports lead to monetary penalties (MP) than if it leads to no consequences for the providers."