Source · aikyam school

Mechanism Design for Personalized Policy: A Field Experiment Incentivizing Exercise

Original source

Rebecca Dizon-Ross; Ariel Zucker

Mechanism Design for Personalized Policy: A Field Experiment Incentivizing Exercise (2025)

Working paper

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Eliminating price differentials across targets isolates nonstandard behavioral drivers like commitment demand or intrinsic goal-setting from traditional financial sorting.

Higher rewards for higher step goals induce participants with lower walking costs to select higher targets, while lower rewards for lower goals discourage high walkers from choosing easy targets.

Randomized incentive group assignments create exogenous variations in walking effort that are independent of unobserved individual health behaviors.

Automated evening phone calls establish a simple, daily routine that reduces reporting friction and reinforces habit formation.

Policy tree algorithms non-parametrically detect multidimensional treatment effect heterogeneity across complex baseline data, identifying subgroups that respond most to specific targets.

Factoring fixed design and variable implementation costs into cost-per-benefit calculations prevents underestimating the real-world operational expenses of complex targeting schemes.

Self-monitoring with pedometers creates daily feedback awareness and goal-setting salience, encouraging baseline effort without monetary distortion.

Measuring activity without financial rewards for meeting targets reveals an individual's intrinsic walking type before incentives alter behavior.

Participants frequently possess accurate self-knowledge regarding their general physical activity habits even without pedometer tracking experience.

Informational nudges aim to reduce decision complexity and inform participants of their expected optimal targets using expert data analysis.