Original source
Subjective versus Objective Incentives and Employee Productivity (2022)
Research manuscript
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Pair high-stakes subjective rating systems with high-frequency managerial monitoring and explicit evaluation rubrics to eliminate demographic evaluation disparities.
"When manager evaluations affect employees' raises, we find male teachers receive 10% higher evaluations controlling for a rich set of teacher actions and student outcomes. When evaluations are only used for feedback, but do not have a financial stake, we see no difference in evaluation score by gender."
Establish mandatory minimum observation quotas (at least 4-5 formal direct observations per employee per year) to ensure managers possess sufficient qualitative data to execute subjective appraisals accurately.
"Teachers in our sample spend much more time directly observing teachers. They do about twice the number of classroom observations each year (4.7 versus 2.5 in the US)."
Structure teacher incentive systems to evaluate holistic classroom practices—such as student-centered learning and positive classroom climate—rather than relying exclusively on standardized test score growth.
"Teachers under the objective incentive contract have a more negative class climate and less student-centered lessons. Both see a decrease of around 0.1 pts."
Assess evaluator accuracy using peer-appraisal cross-checks before deploying discretionary subjective incentive schemes, ensuring managerial evaluation error remains low.
"We find there is no effect of subjective performance pay on student test scores for managers who are in the top quintile of this inaccuracy measure."
Implement subjective performance evaluation frameworks where managers set explicit effort-based goals annually and conduct frequent direct observations to align raises with multidimensional productivity.
"On average, moving from the 50th percentile value added to the 90th percentile value added would increase a teacher's subjective rating by 0.7sd."
Design compensation contracts that incorporate qualitative manager evaluations alongside quantitative benchmarks to preserve effort across non-measurable performance dimensions.
"Objective incentives negatively affect student socio-emotional development, including a significant decrease in love of learning and an increased likelihood students say they want to change schools. Subjective incentives result in a small positive effect on overall socio-emotional skills."
Implement rank-order percentile value-added tournaments within operating units to control total compensation budget variance while providing linear incentive power.
"Both treatments are within-school tournaments and have the same distribution of raise thresholds. These similarities allow us to isolate the effort response from just changing the performance metric... Both contracts increase test scores by 0.09 sd."
Audit performance evaluation systems for perceived noise by surveying staff on whether hard work directly determines compensation, and redesign metrics to focus on controllable actions rather than noisy outcome variables.
"Using this instrument for noise, we find that a 1 SD increase in the perceived noisiness of the contract decreases hours worked by 13 and decreases student test scores by 0.2 SD."
Include unannounced prior-year remedial items on endline student assessments to audit whether performance-pay score gains reflect genuine knowledge transfer.
"Given that we find similar if not larger effects on these types of questions, it appears that treatment effects are coming from actual learning as opposed to memorizing curriculum."
Deploy manager-discretionary subjective evaluations to directly incentivize fundamental baseline employee behaviors like physical workplace attendance.
"Relative to a control group mean of 145 days, subjective teachers are present an additional 6 days."
Implement a multi-tiered random sampling audit system with escalation triggers to deter employee gaming while maintaining decentralized grading efficiency.
"10% of all teacher's exams were regraded. If the teachers' grade and the auditor's grade were off by more than 5%, another 10% of their tests were audited... Overall, grade manipulation was small... There was no heterogeneity in grading accuracy by treatment."