Original source
Who Gets the Job Referral? Evidence from a Social Networks Experiment (2012)
Journal article · American Economic Review · 102(7), 3574–3593
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Used in these cards
Ability-Dependent Peer Screening
"High-performing original participants (OPs) are capable of selecting individuals who are themselves highly skilled, but that these individuals only select highly skilled network members when given a contract in which their own pay is indexed to the referral's performance."
Casual-Labor Field-Laboratory Screening Proxy
"Our study takes place in urban Kolkata, India. Many of our subjects work in informal and casual labor markets, where employment is often temporary and uncertain; these conditions are closely approximated by the day-labor nature of the task in our laboratory."
Endogenous Incentive-Driven Referral Participation
"High-ability participants are more likely to make a referral if they receive performance pay than low-ability participants, suggesting that the expected return to performance pay is larger for high-ability participants."
Fixed-Fee Referral Invariance
"Across all specifications, the joint p-values of the overall effects of fixed fee and interaction terms are never close to significant."
Multi-Contextual Network Spillover Mismatch
"In a developing country setting like the one in this paper, the majority of the literature on networks emphasizes how individuals use network links to improve risk sharing... These spillovers may cause networks to smooth search frictions using network links that do not represent particularly strong job matches."
Network Incentive Trade-Off Threshold Condition
"Comparing these two expressions, i will select friend 1 if $P_i > \frac{\sigma_{i2}-\sigma_{i1}}{2\beta_i-1}$... increasing $P_i$ makes referring the high-ability friend relatively more attractive than referring the low-ability friend."
Network Inequality Perpetuation
"Theory has also suggested a potential cost to relying on social networks to address these labor market imperfections: the use of networks in job search can perpetuate inequalities across groups in the long run (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 2004)."
Occupational Relationship Referral Substitution
"Individuals assigned to the cognitive high-stakes performance pay treatment were almost 8 percentage points more likely to refer a coworker... The high-stakes group was also less likely to refer a relative than the fixed fee groups."
Peer Cognitive Evaluation Asymmetry
"High-ability OPs are able to predict their referrals' ability... Low-ability OPs, on the other hand, are not systematically able to predict their referrals' performance..."
Side-Payment Neutralization Protocol
"To eliminate the incentive for such a side payment, both the OP and referral are informed that the OP will be paid the maximum performance bonus regardless of the referral's performance before the referral performs either task."
Social Network Risk-Sharing Distortion
"When individuals in our study receive performance pay, so that their finder's fee depends on their referral's performance, they become 7 percentage points less likely to refer relatives, who are more integrated into our respondents' risk-sharing networks according to the survey data."
Standardized Cognitive Task Benchmarking
"Given that the raven and digit span tests have been used extensively in the psychology literature on measuring cognitive ability (Snow, Kyllonen, and Marshalek 1984), this correlation provides reassuring evidence on the validity of our cognitive task."
Supervisory Cost-Penalized Task Metric
"Incorrect attempts are important as proxies for how much supervisory time an employee requires in order to successfully complete a task. To utilize variation from all three components of performance, we use the following metric: A perfect score for a given puzzle is assigned for solving the puzzle in under one minute with no incorrect attempts."
Supervisory-Time Efficiency Metric
"Incorrect attempts are important as proxies for how much supervisory time an employee requires in order to successfully complete a task."
Social Network Extraction of Unobservable Productivity
"That is, highly skilled, incentivized OPs are bringing in referrals who are highly skilled in ways that are hard to predict by the covariates in our data, even though some of those covariates are highly correlated with puzzle task performance."
Weather-Shock Selection Correction
"One extra day of rainfall within the three-day referral cycle makes an OP 21 percentage points less likely to return with a referral to the laboratory."