Source · aikyam school

“Good Politicians”: Experimental Evidence on Motivations for Political Candidacy and Government Performance

Original source

Saad Gulzar; Muhammad Yasir Khan

“Good Politicians”: Experimental Evidence on Motivations for Political Candidacy and Government Performance (2023)

Working paper

Search for this source ↗

Permission for School’s use is unestablished.

Used in these cards

Matching survey subjects directly to official government records eliminates survey response bias and measurement error.

Combining private and public messaging shifts both the intrinsic and extrinsic calculus of candidacy simultaneously.

Comparing budget allocations against citizen priorities on a normalized metric quantifies how closely politicians respond to constituent preferences.

Measuring prosocial orientation prior to treatment prevents experimental interventions from contaminating baseline attitudes.

Forcing respondents to allocate a fixed budget creates trade-offs that mirror real-world resource scarcity.

Standardizing raw local budget line items into consistent policy domains enables rigorous comparison across local councils.

Clear procedural details lower the administrative barrier to entering politics by showing eligible citizens the exact steps required to declare candidacy.

Highlighting personal returns reinforces the baseline perception that politicians run for selfish motives, discouraging public-spirited individuals from entering the race while failing to boost overall candidacy.

Measuring constituent approval and institutional trust directly reveals whether political recruitment changes translate into broader democratic legitimacy.

Surveying candidates immediately after nomination filing captures accurate self-reported motivation and community endorsement before election outcomes occur.

Private prosocial messaging aims to raise an individual's intrinsic motivation by making community welfare returns salient.