Source · aikyam school

Can Voters be Primed to Choose Better Legislators? Experimental Evidence from Rural India

Original source

Abhijit Banerjee; Donald Green; Jennifer Green; Rohini Pande

Can Voters be Primed to Choose Better Legislators? Experimental Evidence from Rural India

Working paper

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Randomly assigning party labels to hypothetical candidate profiles disentangles voter party preferences from actual candidate characteristics.

Children's rallies generate community enthusiasm and public visibility across village wards.

Dramatic edutainment engages low-literacy audiences emotionally and intellectually without provoking defensive partisan resistance.

Local journalists possess insider knowledge regarding candidate behavior and financial impropriety that is otherwise inaccessible to the public.

Centralized village meetings create a shared public space where individual citizens hear non-partisan development arguments collectively.

Reading aloud official lists of completed local projects provides voters with verifiable information about whether an incumbent actually delivered public goods to their village.

Scheduling civic sessions at night accommodates the work schedules of daily commuters and day laborers who are otherwise excluded from daytime public gatherings.

Discouraging caste-based voting undercuts a dominant decision heuristic while directing voter attention toward candidate quality and performance.

General anti-corruption messaging emphasizes politician honesty, but leaves voters' dominant caste-based decision heuristics intact.

Involving community members in mapping ensures accurate spatial knowledge of marginalized wards that outside campaign staff might otherwise overlook.

Providing a private paper ballot and a portable ballot box mirrors official voting secrecy, overcoming social desirability bias and fear of political retribution.