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Productivity, credit, risk, and the demand for weather index insurance in smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia

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Craig McIntosh; Alexander Sarris; Fotis Papadopoulos

Productivity, credit, risk, and the demand for weather index insurance in smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia (2013)

journal article · Agricultural Economics · 44, 399–417

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C 2013 International Association of Agricultural Economists

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Develop transparent visual educational materials and simplified payout triggers during product marketing to reduce contract ambiguity for smallholders.

"More subtle explanations explored in recent years include the idea of "ambiguity aversion" (Bryan, 2010), under which households do not perfectly understand the distribution from which the relevant probabilities are drawn, and because they have a dislike of taking on contracts with uncertain properties their demand is limited."

Provide dedicated seasonal input credit solutions rather than relying on livestock asset holdings as an indicator of smallholder cash purchasing power.

"The second stage in the quantity of fertilizer purchased indicates positive influence of land cultivated and agricultural capital, as one would expect. However, it indicates a negative influence of the number of big animals, which is a proxy for wealth, and this seems counterintuitive."

Establish dense weather monitoring networks or satellite remote-sensing indices to minimize spatial and peril mismatch before offering index insurance products to farmers.

"A product with high basis risk simply fails to achieve the desired goal of providing protection against correlated risks to consumption, and hence is not demanded for perfectly good reasons."

Synchronize sales campaigns for agricultural insurance and financial products with post-harvest periods when rural households experience peak cash liquidity.

"Second, the various delays in implementation implied that when the product was actually marketed, many farmers might have already bought the fertilizer they intended to use on cash, and hence they might have already incurred the investment, hence not needing insurance for an amount already spent... Third, the timing of the marketing and insurance sales did not pay attention to the availability of cash."

Incorporate downside basis risk protections or supplemental loss-verification mechanisms to prevent risk-averse farmers from rejecting index insurance contracts.

"Clarke (2011)... suggests that in the presence of basis risk it is possible that households end up without payouts in the worst state of the world and yet still must pay premiums; hence highly risk-averse agents may dislike the product."

Deploy direct-to-farmer visual marketing campaigns delivered by trained insurance representatives rather than relying on multi-tiered extension networks for novel financial products.

"In particular the information conveyed to the farmers was not direct, but through Ministry of Agriculture officials, 'model farmers,' and local extension agents. It is not clear whether the information about the nature of the insurance and interlinked credit and insurance contracts was transmitted clearly to all farmers."

Inject targeted liquid credit or input subsidies to enable smallholders to scale cash inputs until the value of marginal product equals marginal factor cost.

"For purchased inputs, the average marginal product is 4.5, which is far above the 'market' value of 1. This implies that inputs are used at levels much below their optimal values."

Encourage farmer cooperative aggregation and joint input procurement to help smallholders achieve operational scale economies.

"The F-test for the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on the land, inputs, labor, and capital variables is equal to 1 is rejected, and the sum of these coefficients is larger than 1, suggesting increasing economies of scale."

Structure interlinked agricultural credit contracts with clear institutional risk-sharing boundaries so intermediary cooperatives are not required to absorb non-weather default risk.

"These supply-side problems were particularly severe in the interlinked arm, where the contract required the local CUs to guarantee the nonweather-related part of the loan, a risk which the CUS refused to accept."

Account for access to irrigation when designing input supply targets, as irrigated farms require lower per-hectare chemical fertilizer volume than rain-fed farms.

"Negative significance is exhibited by the average area irrigated, suggesting that irrigation maybe a substitute for the application of fertilizer..."

Evaluate land consolidation policies against micro-climate risk mitigation benefits before mandating plot unification in rain-fed agricultural zones.

"Of the several other variables introduced, the significant ones include... the number of parcels in the cultivated land (+)..."

Educate smallholders on historical multi-year climate probabilities to counter the misbelief that recent droughts reduce the probability of subsequent rainfall deficits.

"The negative result on the shock in the previous year would be explained if households expect weather shocks to be negatively serially autocorrelated."

Target weather index insurance sales campaigns toward farmers with existing high input expenditures to safeguard current investments before expecting insurance to drive adoption among non-users.

"High fertilizer use (indicating a lower marginal product of cash inputs) is a strong determinant of insurance uptake, the sum insured, and the amount of own cash that farmers put into buying insurance. This suggests that the product is likely to provide protection primarily to those who were already using inputs at high levels, rather than enabling a 'transformative' increase in input use among those who had not previously used them."

Streamline agricultural input supply chains by enabling decentralized retail stockholding closer to planting periods rather than relying solely on advance aggregation by cooperative unions.

"More than 70% of the households reported that fertilizer is often supplied late and around 40% of the households reported that supplies were inadequate."

Conduct pre-implementation agro-climatic hazard assessments across target communities to verify that the insured weather metric matches the dominant local driver of crop loss.

"...while the hypothesis was that the main risk faced by households in the nonrandomly selected kebeles was rainfall deficit, it turned out that in only two thirds of the villages where the study was implemented, the main risk faced was rainfall deficit."

Invest in automated weather station maintenance and missing-data imputation protocols prior to launching commercial index insurance products in developing nations.

"Subsequently, the number of study kebeles had to be further restricted to 49, as the available historical record of rainfall for 10 of the 17 stations was not complete enough to allow the construction of rainfall indexes that would be acceptable by NISCO's partner reinsurance company."

Design credit contracts bundled with state-contingent debt forgiveness or index insurance to shield smallholders from asset loss following severe weather shocks.

"In short many farmers seem to be risk rationed in the terminology of Boucher et al. (2008). This risk arises because the incentive constraints against morally hazardous behavior require the lender to leave substantial risk on the borrower, and if a sufficient component of that risk is outside the control of the borrower, then profitable loan contracts may be refused by borrowers."

Tailor formal microinsurance marketing toward middle-tier income households that face severe vulnerability to catastrophic shocks but lack sufficient self-insurance reserves.

"Among economic variables the per capita income is negatively correlated with uptake, indicating perhaps that wealthier households do not need WII."

Bundle weather index insurance premiums into the principal of seasonal input loans so farmers pay for risk protection at harvest rather than upfront during planting.

"Demand for the interlinked products is higher and less price elastic, and the demand for the interlinked product with the premium financed is even higher."

Evaluate market demand for agricultural microinsurance through real-money field trials with randomized price vouchers rather than hypothetical willingness-to-pay surveys.

"The study compares a survey-based estimate of willingness to pay with actual uptake for the weather insurance, finding the stated and actual demand to be almost completely uncorrelated."

Deploy promotional subsidy vouchers during initial market rollouts to induce trial and overcome zero-demand adoption barriers for complex novel financial products.

"In reality, those offered a zero subsidy within the study sample had exactly zero uptake, indicating that there is an enormous effect of the vouchers (independent of subsidy amount) on realized demand."

Randomizing offer prices across survey respondents generates precise demand curves at low cost.

Reinsurers require unbroken historical weather series to calculate financial risk exposure accurately before backing local insurance policies.

Using instrumental variables eliminates endogeneity bias caused by unobserved farmer ability and simultaneous input choices.

Financed insurance removes the upfront liquidity constraint that prevents poor farmers from buying risk protection before planting.

Utilizing established public extension hierarchies allows project teams to cover vast geographic areas quickly without building new sales infrastructure.

Aggregating individual smallholder demand through village cooperatives reduces administrative transaction costs for commercial banks and input suppliers.

Randomized discount vouchers lower immediate liquidity barriers and incentivize trial adoption for unfamiliar microinsurance products.