Original source
Why Don’t Jobseekers Search More? Barriers and Returns to Search on a Job Matching Platform (2024)
Research manuscript
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Disambiguate behavioral interventions by evaluating whether outreach alters user beliefs about outcome probabilities or merely removes execution steps.
"Table C.8 shows that treatment does not shift jobseekers' answers to either of these questions... The survey data show that treatment does not increase respondents' perceptions of the average values of V or P on the platform."
Expand job search assistance and application subsidies without restricting output targets, as additional applications generated by relaxing behavioral initiation barriers do not decay in quality or interview yield.
"Using treatment as an instrument for applying shows that marginal applications submitted due to treatment have a 5.9% probability of yielding interviews, which is neither substantively nor statistically different from the 6.3% probability for applications from the control group."
Avoid using random default sorting or top-of-list placement to drive user engagement on matching platforms, as forced random exposure induces low-yield actions with rapid return decay.
"Listing vacancies first produces more applications with decreasing, rather than constant, returns... the average interview probability for marginal applications submitted because the vacancy was listed first is 2.4%... sharply decreasing returns."
Expand application facilitation programs broadly without imposing strict pre-screening filters, as reducing initiation friction does not induce adverse selection in applicant qualification.
"Marginal and inframarginal applications come from jobseekers with similar observed characteristics... mean education and CV quality scores... are almost identical for the marginal and inframarginal applications."
Evaluate digital matching platform interventions on total employment outcomes without assuming digital applications displace non-digital job search channels.
"Any employment effect is unlikely to be driven by treatment effects on off-platform search, which are negative but close to zero at the extensive and several intensive margins."
Deploy search and matching platform algorithms that surface high-value matches while simultaneously eliminating step-initiation barriers for those targeted matches.
"Control group jobseekers miss many high-value matches... but the share of total applications sent to each quintile does not differ between treatment and control groups."
Prioritize eliminating active step-initiation thresholds over monetary subsidies or minor time-saving tweaks when designing user assistance programs in low-resource environments.
"This callback request treatment has an effect one quarter of the size of the main phone call treatment... free callback reminder treatment has an effect one hundredth of the size... showing that time costs... can explain only a small share of the effect."
Randomize or rotate the presentation sequence of options on decision platforms to prevent list-position bias from skewing user choices toward top-listed items.
"31% of applications go to the first vacancy listed on the call in both the treatment and control groups... jobseekers are disproportionately likely to apply to first-listed vacancies, but this pattern does not differ between treated and control jobseekers."
Reconfigure outreach platforms to initiate contact and prompt immediate decision-making directly rather than relying on users to initiate actions after receiving passive notifications.
"An experiment that changes the default process for initiating job applications increases applications by 600% on a search platform in Pakistan."
Re-architect public benefit and program delivery workflows to replace passive reminders with default interactive initiation prompts that complete action steps on behalf of users.
"Table C.4 shows that the effect of the reminder message is one-fourteenth as large as the effect of the phone call (p < 0.001)... showing that reminder effects do not explain the intervention's impact."
Implement active platform outreach and default opt-in application policies across public employment services to correct systematic under-searching without fear of depressing match returns.
"The finding of constant returns to marginal applications, combined with limited spillovers onto other jobseekers, raises the possibility of suboptimally low search effort."
Structure platform notifications to provide immediate, one-click execution channels timed during moments of low cognitive burden or immediately preceding hard deadlines.
"We view time-varying psychological costs of initiating applications as a reasonable explanation for our main experimental findings... the same jobseeker will experience similar returns to applications submitted in untreated periods and in treated periods."
Scale job application encouragement programs across matching platforms without restricting participation out of concern for applicant crowd-out when platform vacancy fill rates remain well below capacity.
"Estimates of spillover effects are small and not statistically significant... taking these factors together, it is possible that firms in this labor market receive too few suitable applications in the absence of treatment for crowd-out to be relevant."
Shorten application windows when pairing notifications with proactive initiation support to maximize intervention efficacy before control group catch-up occurs.
"The treatment effect on applying is 0.072 percentage points lower (standard error 0.004) with each extra day between the notification and the deadline."