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Individuals aged 55 to 65 at the time of winning exhibit a significantly larger labor earnings reduction, with an additional MPE interaction coefficient of -0.167 (standard error 0.070), whereas individuals over 65 show no such additional reduction [4, 10, 23].
Overall insurance take-up reached 42%. In non-payout villages, labor participation differences between insured and uninsured workers were statistically zero (p > 0.10, point estimate -4.6 days), whereas in payout villages, insurance payouts (Rs. 300 to Rs. 1,200) reduced labor participation by 28.5 percentage points and days worked by 15.44 days.
Mandatory participation eliminates non-market leisure time value ($h = 0.013$, equivalent to ~2% of UI benefit levels or >1% of worker productivity), disciplining worker outside options and lowering equilibrium wages by 0.03%, which encourages firms to expand overall vacancy postings by 2.4%.
High-potential microentrepreneurs (top third ranked by peers) invested significantly more in business inventory and durable assets while decreasing household expenditure, working an additional 9.9 hours per week and 4.6 days per month compared to lower-ranked recipients.
Elasticity of effort with respect to piece rates remains positive (+0.06), demonstrating that guaranteed show-up pay does not eliminate piece-rate incentive responsiveness or induce target-earning labor supply contraction.
The gender interaction term coefficient with yearly prize is +0.002 (standard error 0.057), demonstrating no statistically significant difference in marginal propensity to earn between men (baseline MPE of -0.124) and women (MPE of -0.122).
Participants who attended business training with a friend experienced a 4 percentage point (40 percent relative) reduction in reporting their primary occupation as housewife, accompanied by significantly increased labor hours worked and higher total sales compared to control subjects.
Insurance payouts reduced agricultural labor participation by 28.5 percentage points at median rainfall shocks and reduced total days worked by 15.44 days during the season, whereas non-payout insurance offers had zero significant effect (-4.6 days, p > 0.10).
Monthly cash benefits were reduced linearly against labor earnings up to the minimum wage (€1,050/month), creating an implicit tax rate of 24%. During the first six months, full-time employment declined significantly by 3 percentage points (ITT -0.18 months of total employment from a control mean of 2.41 months, p < 0.05; TOT -0.21 months, p < 0.01), though this negative employment effect disappeared by the second year.
Urban educated men worked only 23.4 hours per week conditional on employment; acquiring 5 days of work experience increased labor supply on the intensive margin by 1 additional day worked per week on average (p < 0.10).
A 1 million SEK prize reduces weekly working hours by 1.282 hours (3.9% reduction, p < 0.001) while monthly full-time equivalent wages fall by only 147.3 SEK (0.6% reduction, p = 0.080); reduced working hours account for 81% of the overall drop in wage earnings, whereas wage rate changes account for only 18%.
In Côte d'Ivoire, net participant earning gains accounted for only 53 percent of total public works wages due to foregone lower-paying work. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, when one family member participated, other household members worked 1.5 percentage points less, contributing to a 9 percent decline in total monthly household earnings.
Business process outsourcing employment increased by 4.6 percentage points (p < 0.01) with no statistically significant decline in agricultural labor (-0.008, p > 0.10) or non-BPO paid work (-0.012, p > 0.10), proving total female labor supply expanded from previously inactive populations.
In villages experiencing delayed monsoon payouts, receiving an insurance payout lowered labor force participation by 28.5 percentage points (t-stat = -1.635) and reduced harvest labor supply by 15.44 days (t-stat = -1.391) at median rainfall deficiency.
Insured wage workers receiving insurance payouts had a labor participation rate 28.5 percentage points lower than uninsured peers at median rainfall shock [18], working 15.4 fewer days in the season [19]. A 10% increase in laborer insurance marketing raises village wages by 24.7% in payout states [20].
Men in the full treatment group were significantly more likely to work in the public sector, compensating for household income that had shifted under the direct control of female household members.
Mean hourly MVT rises monotonically from $4.80 for 5–10 hours/week to $8.95 for 20–25 hours/week, $12.00–$14.68 for 30–40 hours/week, and $21.89–$22.69 for 40–50 hours/week, yielding an average flow value of non-work time relative to pre-tax predicted market wage ($\tilde{z}$) of 0.58 ($s.e. = 0.04$) [11-13].
Linear specification yields an underestimated MPE of -0.051 due to extreme prize skewness, whereas a quadratic specification yields MPE derivatives of -0.114 at prize = $0 and -0.097 at median prize ($32,000), with a highly significant quadratic term (t-statistic = 4.8).
Unconstrained logit models yield an imprecisely estimated marginal value of time of $43.10 (s.e. = 15.90) for 40 vs 45 hours, whereas imposing linear intercept constraints reduces the standard error tenfold, yielding a precise MVT of $21.89 (s.e. = 1.70).
Participants randomly assigned to receive paid work experienced significantly stronger psychological and mental health benefits compared to participants receiving the exact same cash amount without work.
Short-term work experience produced a statistically non-significant effect on monthly reservation wages (IV estimate = +$124.40, p > 0.10) and no significant increase in active job search duration (IV estimate = +0.089, p > 0.10), ruling out reservation wage shifts as the mechanism driving daily wage returns.