Original source
Experimental Evidence on the Nature of the Danish Employment Miracle (2008)
working paper
Search for this source ↗Permission for School’s use is unestablished.
Used in these cards
Active Labour Market Policy Threat Effect
"The threat effect is driven by the perceived risk of having to attend some activity, and the treatment effect we found in this study is precisely generated by the perceived intensification of monitoring and programme participation prospects."
Voluntary Quit Benefit Sanctioning
"The reason for choosing a six-week window is that we want to include persons who have just left education or who have quit their job themselves, and these events involve a five-week sanction period, in which the person may not receive UI benefits."
Birthdate-Based Randomization Design
"specifically, all individuals in the two counties who became unemployed during this period were randomized into a treatment and a control group based on their birthday; those born on the 1st to the 15th were given the treatment, and those born on the 16th to the 31st were not."
Caseworker Meeting Intensity Superiority
"Hence, it appears in general as if meetings have larger threat effects than programmes, which is quite interesting, since it indicates that the monitoring part of counseling and monitoring programmes is the most important one."
Ex-Ante Regime Notification Effect
"Since the treatment in part consists of giving the unemployed worker information about the new labour market regime, treatment starts on the day the individual receives that information."
Immune Subpopulation in Unobserved Heterogeneity
"the maximization of the log likelihood invariably ends up preferring a specification with two unobserved 'types', one small group (1-2% of the inflow into unemployment) of 'immune'persons with a zero exit rate from unemployment, and the other a large group with a positive exit rate from unemployment."
Job Match Quality and Recurrence Mitigation
"They find that some of these schemes significantly reduce unemployment duration, and moreover they find that they all improve the match quality in the sense that the time until unemployment recurrence is prolonged."
Leisure Tax Hypothesis of Active Policies
"programme participation and possibly active labour market policies in general acts as a 'tax' on unemployed individuals' leisure time; by taxing away some of the unemployed workers' time, the marginal utility of spending time in unemployment falls..."
Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) Model
"We shall begin by making an assumption of a mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model, that is, the hazard rates can be written in the following form: \theta_1(t|X,V) = \lambda_1(t) \cdot exp[f_1(X)] \cdot V"
Private Placement Agency Contracting
"We also know if the treatment of the worker is being handled by case workers in the employment agency or if it has been contracted out to a private agency."
Private Sector Wage Subsidies
"These involve temporary employment in a private firm at the negotiated wage, where the employment agency pays a subsidy to the firm of around half the wage. These jobs typically have a duration of 6 months."
Active Program Lock-In Effect
"None of the specific treatments have positive effects, indeed, some of them have large negative lock-in effects, and some even have large negative post-programme effects."
Programme Factory Rule-Based Activation
"This was called the 'programme factory', where participants were assigned to programmes not on the basis of need, but because of the rules."
Public Cost-Benefit Valuation of Policy Regimes
"They ignore general equilibrium effects, but find nevertheless that the programme has a value to society of €2000 per unemployed individual exposed to the intensive policy regime."
Regional Administrative Enforcement Variance
Regional Implementation Heterogeneity
"There are, in essence, two different experiments, one in each region, and they should therefore be analysed separately."
Search Channel Substitution Under Monitoring
"They use data from a social experiment and find no evidence that counseling and monitoring affect the exit rate to work. Moreover, they find that increased monitoring leads to a shift from informal to formal job search."